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Abstract
We explore the dynamics of group inequality when segregation of social networks places the
initially less affluent group at a disadvantage in acquiring human capital. Extending Loury
(1977), we demonstrate that (i) group differences in economic success can persist across genera-
tions in the absence of either discrimination or group differences in ability, provided that social
segregation is sufficiently great, (ii) there is threshold level of integration above which group
inequality cannot be sustained, (iii) this threshold varies systematically but non-monotonically
with the population share of the disadvantaged group, (iv) crossing the threshold induces con-
vergence to a common high level of human capital if the less affluent population share is suf-
ficiently small (and the opposite, otherwise), and (v) a race-neutral policy that reduces the
cost of acquiring human capital can expand the range over which reducing segregation can be
Pareto-improving.
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1 Introduction
In Brown v. Board of Education the U.S. Supreme Court (1954) struck down laws enforcing racial
segregation of public schools on the grounds that ‘separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal’. The justices thus endorsed the testimony of the psychologist Kenneth Clark that ‘like
other human beings who are subjected to an obviously inferior status,’ African American children
in segregated schools ‘have been definitely harmed in the development of their personalities’ (Beggs,
1995, pp. 10-11).
Many hoped that the demise of legally enforced segregation and discrimination against African
Americans during the 1950s and 1960s coupled with the apparent reduction in racial prejudice
among whites would provide an environment in which significant social and economic racial dispar-
ities would not persist. But while substantial racial convergence in incomes did occur from the 50s
to the 70s, little progress has since been made in raising the median annual income of full time year
round male and female African American workers relative to their white counterparts (President’s
Council of Economic Advisors, 1991 and 2003). Similarly, the significant racial convergence in years
of schooling attained and cognitive scores at given levels of schooling that occurred prior to 1980
appears not to have continued subsequently (Neal 2005). Significant racial differences in mortality,
wealth, subjective well being, and other indicators also persist (Deaton and Lubotsky, 2001, Wolff,
1998, Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004).
Enduring discriminatory practices are no doubt part of the explanation (Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan, 2004). These may be motivated by racial prejudice or hostility, but need not be–
statistical discrimination is sufficient, as the contributions of Arrow (1973), Phelps (1972), and
others have shown. Here we explore what may be another aspect of the explanation: racial assor-
tation in social networks. Group differences in economic success may persist across generations in
the absence of discrimination against the less affluent group because racial segregation of friendship
networks, mentoring relationships, neighborhoods, workplaces and schools places the less affluent
group at a disadvantage in acquiring the things — contacts, information, cognitive skills, behavioral
attributes — that contribute to economic success. In doing this we follow Glenn Loury (1995):
...the full economic opportunity of any individual does not just depend on his own
income; it is also determined by the incomes of those with whom he is socially affiliated.
The patterns of such affiliation in our society are not arbitrary but derive in part from
ethnic and social class identity.
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We know from Schelling (1971) and the subsequent literature that equilibrium racial sorting
does not require discrimination against the less affluent group and may occur even with strongly
pro-integrationist preferences (Young 1998, Sethi and Somanathan 2004). Preferentially associating
with members of one’s own kind (known as homophily) is a common human trait (Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, and Flament, 1971) and is well documented for race and ethnic identification, religion, and
other characteristics. A survey of recent empirical work reported that:
We find strong homophily on race and ethnicity in a wide range of relationships, ranging
from the most intimate bonds of marriage and confiding, to the more limited ties of
schoolmate friendship and work relations, to the limited networks of discussion about
a particular topic, to the mere fact of appearing in public or ‘knowing about’ someone
else. ...Homophily limits peoples’ social worlds in a way that has powerful implications
for the information they receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions they
experience (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001, pp. 415, 420).
In a nationally representative sample of 130 schools (and 90,118 students) same race friend-
ships were almost twice as likely as cross-race friendships, controlling for school racial composition
(Moody, 2001). In this sample, by comparison to the friends of white students, the friends of African
American students had significantly lower grades, attachment to school, and parental socioeconomic
status. There is also evidence that peer effects such as penalties for ‘acting white’ among African
American students provide disincentives for academic achievement (Fryer and Torelli, 2005).
While there are many channels through which the racial assortation of social networks might
disadvantage members of the less well of group, statistical identification of these effects often is an
insurmountable challenge. The reason is that networks are selected by individuals and as a result
plausible identification strategies for the estimation of the causal effect of exogenous variation in
the composition of an individual’s networks are difficult to devise. Hoxby (2000) and Hanushek,
Kain, and Rivkin (2002) use the year-to-year cohort variation in racial composition within grade
and school to identify racial network effects, finding large negative effects of racial assortation
on the academic achievement of black students. Studies using randomized assignment of college
roommates have also found some important behavioral and academic peer effects (Kremer and
Levy, 2003, Sacerdote, 2000, Zimmerman and Williams, 2003). A study of annual work hours
using longitudinal data and individual fixed effects found strong neighborhood effects especially
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for the least well educated individuals and the poorest neighborhoods (Weinberg et al., 2004). An
experimental study documents strong peer effects in a production task, particularly for those with
low productivity in the absence of peers (Falk and Ichino, 2004). On the other hand, a number
of studies using randomized assignment or other compelling identification strategies have failed to
detect important peer effects (Oreopoulos, 2003, Jacob, 2003). No available studies to date allow an
estimate of the extent (if any) to which social network effects explain racial differences in economic
success.
But the logic expressed by Loury is plausible, and an exploration of the dynamics of group
inequality in the presence of racial assortation of social networks may therefore be illuminating. In
a classic paper, Loury (1977) identified empirically plausible conditions under which social stratifi-
cation by income alone could not sustain group inequality in the long-run. Under these conditions,
group inequality can persist only if patterns of interaction reflect some degree of segregation, over
and above that implied by income sorting alone. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Lundberg
and Startz (1998) and Durlauf (1999, 2005). We build on this work by addressing the following
series of questions. First, can the racial assortation of social affiliates support permanent group in-
equality in the absence of discrimination against the less affluent group? Second, is there a threshold
level of integration above which group inequality cannot be indefinitely sustained? Third, how does
this threshold, if it exists, vary with the population share of the disadvantaged group? Fourth, if
integration proceeds beyond such a threshold, resulting in convergence of group incomes, does this
equalization arise through reductions in the income of the initially advantaged group, or through
increases in the income of the initially disadvantaged group? And fifth, are there Pareto-improving
policy interventions that can reduce both segregation and group inequality?
To address this set of interrelated questions we model a setting in which the initial characteristics
of the social affiliates of individuals in the less affluent group differ from those of individuals in the
more affluent group sufficiently to induce the latter to acquire higher income-earning characteristics
than the former. Because the intergenerational human capital transmission process is characterized
by regression to the mean (Bowles and Gintis, 2002), it is not obvious that such a situation is
dynamically stable. In the next section we present a model of the way individuals acquire income-
earning traits. We assume the subjective cost of human capital investment varies inversely with
an individual trait (‘ability’) and the mean level of human capital in one’s social network. Group
differences in social network human capital are determined by the level of human capital in each
group and the degree of segregation. There are no group differences in the cost function for acquiring
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human capital or in the ability distribution, and the benefits of human capital are identical for all
individuals.
In section 3 we study the case where all individuals are of the same ability and identify the
conditions on the degree of segregation and the relative size of the two groups such that a stable
asymmetric equilibrium may exist, namely one in which group differences in economic success
persist indefinitely. We are also able to identify conditions under which, starting from such a
stable asymmetric equilibrium, reductions in segregation will induce a transition to a symmetric
equilibrium characterized by either high or low levels of human capital for both groups. We show
that there exists a critical population share of the less affluent group above which the low level
symmetric equilibrium will occur. Section 4 generalizes the model to the case of heterogeneous
ability identically distributed in the two groups, again identifying conditions under which group
differences will be permanent. We simulate a group-divided population to explore the conditions
under which the groups will converge, and if they do whether it is to a high or low level equilibrium.
Our penultimate section explores policies that by addressing group inequality and segregation
simultaneously can increase the scope for Pareto-improving desegregation.
2 The Model
We model the process of acquiring human capital as a discrete choice, the private costs of which are
influenced by the level of human capital among one’s social affiliates. Consider a single population
consisting of two groups, black and white, with population shares β and 1 − β respectively. Each
individual has a set of social affiliates that is drawn (in a manner to be described below) from
this population. Let sb(t) and sw(t) denote, for blacks and whites respectively, the proportion of
individuals in the group who have acquired human capital in period t. The mean level of human
capital in the overall population at time t is then
s¯(t) = βsb(t) + (1− β) sw(t). (1)
In a perfectly integrated society, the mean level of human capital in one’s social network would
simply equal s¯(t) on average, regardless of one’s own group membership. When networks are
characterized by some degree of racial assortation, however, the mean level of human capital in
the social network of an individual belonging to group j will lie somewhere between s¯(t) and sj(t),
where j ∈ {b, w}. Suppose that for each individual, a proportion η of social affiliates is drawn from
the group to which that individual belongs, while the remaining (1− η) are randomly drawn from
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the overall population of potential social affiliates. We assume that η is the same for both groups.
Then a proportion η + (1− η)β of a black individual’s social affiliates will also be black, while a
proportion η+(1− η) (1− β) of a white individual’s affiliates will be white. These proportions are
referred to as isolation indexes in the empirical segregation literature.
The parameter η is sometimes refereed to as the correlation ratio (Denton and Massey, 1988),
and in this model is simply the difference between whites and African Americans in the racial
composition their social networks. In the Texas schools studied by Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin
(2002), for example, 39 percent of Black third grade students’ classmates were Black, while only 9
percent of White students classmates were Black, so if one’s classmates were the relevant network,
then η = 0.3. The relevant social network depends on the question under study: for the acquisition
of human capital, parents and (to a lesser extent) siblings and other relatives are among the
strongest influences. Because family members are most often of the same group, the social networks
relevant to our model may be very highly segregated.
Let σj(t) denote the mean level of human capital in the social network of an individual belonging
to group j. This depends on the levels of human capital in each of the two groups, as well as the
extent of segregation η as follows:
σj(t) = ηsj(t) + (1− η) s¯(t). (2)
Except in the case of perfect integration (η = 0), σb and σw will differ as long as sb and sw differ.
The benefits of human capital accumulation are assumed to be constant and identical across
groups, independent of group human capital shares. This means that there is no statistical discrim-
ination in the labor market. Without loss of generality, we can normalize these benefits to equal
0.
The costs of acquiring skills depend on one’s ability, as well as the mean human capital within
one’s social network. By ‘ability’ we do not intend simply learning capacity, IQ or similar cognitive
measures, but rather any personal characteristic of the individual affecting the costs of investing
in human capital, including such things as the tolerance for classroom discipline, the anxiety one
may experience in school and the like. Ability a is distributed independently and identically across
all individuals regardless of group membership. In assuming the equality of ability distributions
across groups we adopt Loury’s (2002) axiom of anti-essentialism, which is standard in the economic
literature on statistical discrimination and group inequality (see also Loury, 1977). The (common)
distribution of ability is given by the distribution function G(a). The costs of acquiring human
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capital are represented by c(a,σ), where c is decreasing in both arguments. For any given level
of social network human capital σ, therefore, there is some threshold ability level a˜(σ) such that
those with ability above this threshold accumulate human capital and those below do not. Since
the benefits of human capital accumulation have been normalized to 0, this threshold is defined
implicitly as the a˜ that satisfies c(a,σ) = 0 for a given value of σ. Note that a˜(σ) is decreasing:
individuals belonging to groups exposed to higher levels of human capital will themselves accumulate
human capital at lower ability thresholds relative to individuals in groups with initially lower levels
of human capital. This difference will be greater when segregation levels are high.
The share of each group j that acquires human capital in period t + 1 is just the fraction of
the group that has ability greater than a˜(σj(t). Thus we obtain the following dynamics for each
j ∈ {b, w}:
sj(t+ 1) = 1−G(a˜(σj(t)). (3)
A steady state pair of skill shares (s∗b , s
∗
w) is such that, for each j ∈ {b, w} ,
s∗j = 1−G(a˜(σ∗j )) = 1−G(a˜(ηs∗j + (1− η) (βs∗b + (1− β) s∗w)).
It is easily seen that no matter what the initial human capital levels sb(0) and sw(0) happen to be,
steady state levels must be equal in the two groups in the case of perfect integration. That is, if
η = 0, then σb(t) = σw(t) = s¯(t) in all periods t, which implies
sb(t+ 1) = sw(t+ 1) = 1−G(a˜(s¯(t))).
Hence the two groups have equal human capital levels in all periods subsequent to the initial period.
Group inequality cannot persist under complete integration in this model.
Consider next the other extreme of complete segregation, corresponding to η = 1. In this case
σj(t) = sj(t) for each group j and so
sj(t+ 1) = 1−G(a˜(sj(t)). (4)
In any steady state, we must have
s∗j = 1−G(a˜(s∗j )), (5)
so group inequality can persist if and only if this equation admits multiple solutions, a necessary
condition for which is the existence of social network effects. Stable steady states of this dynamic
are those for which dsj(t+1)/dsj(t) < 1. In general the existence of multiple solutions will depend
on details of the distribution and cost functions which we will explore presently. But to clarify the
logic of the model, we begin with a simple case in which all individuals have the same ability.
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3 Homogeneous Ability
When all individuals have the same ability, we may suppress the dependence of costs on ability and
write the cost function simply as c (σ) , with c0 < 0. In this case the only stable steady states involve
homogeneous skill levels within groups. (There may exist equilibria in which members of a group
are all indifferent between acquiring human capital or not, and make heterogeneous choices in the
exact proportions that maintain this indifference. Such equilibria will be dynamically unstable, and
we ignore them in what follows.) Suppose that
c(1) < 0 < c(0), (6)
which ensures that the steady states both (sb, sw) = (0, 0) and (sb, sw) = (1, 1) are stable steady
states at all levels of segregation η. Condition (6) also implies that under complete segregation
(η = 1), the distribution (sb, sw) = (0, 1) is a stable steady state. This is the only stable steady
state under complete segregation in which black human capital levels are lower than white.
Since there exists an asymmetric stable steady state under complete segregation but none
under complete integration, one may conjecture that there is a threshold level of segregation such
that persistent group inequality is feasible if and only if the actual segregation level exceeds this
threshold. In order to establish that this is indeed the case, define β˜ as the black population share
at which c(1 − β˜) = 0. This is the value of β for which, under complete integration, the costs of
acquiring human capital are zero for both groups. (This is because, if η = 0 and (sb, sw) = (0, 1),
σj = 1 − β for both groups.) There is a unique β˜ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying this condition since c (·) is a
decreasing function satisfying (6). We then have (see the appendix for all proofs):
Proposition 1. Given any β ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a unique ηˆ(β) such that the stable asymmetric
equilibrium (sb, sw) = (0, 1) exists if and only if η > ηˆ(β). The function ηˆ(β) is positive and
decreasing for all β < β˜, positive and increasing for all β > β˜, and satisfies ηˆ(β˜) = 0.
Proposition 1 establishes that group inequality can persist if segregation is sufficiently high,
where the threshold level of segregation itself depends systematically on the population share β of
the disadvantaged group. If segregation declines to a point below this threshold, group inequality
can no longer be sustained. In this case convergence to a symmetric steady state must occur.
However, there are two of these in the model, since both (sb, sw) = (0, 0) and (sb, sw) = (1, 1) are
stable steady states at all levels of segregation η. Convergence to the former implies that equality is
attained through declines in the human capital of the initially advantaged group. Convergence to
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the latter, in contrast, arise through increases in the human capital of the initially disadvantaged
group. The following result establishes that convergence to the high human capital state occurs if
and only if the population share of the initially disadvantaged group is sufficiently low.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the economy initially has segregation η > ηˆ(β) and is at the stable
steady state (sb, sw) = (0, 1) . If segregation declines to some level η0 < ηˆ(β), then the economy
converges to (sb, sw) = (1, 1) if β < β˜, and to (sb, sw) = (0, 0) if β > β˜.
Figure 1. Effects of segregation and population shares on persistent inequality
Propositions 1-2 are summarized in Figure 1, which identifies three regimes in the space of
parameters β and η. For any value of β (other than β˜), there is a segregation level ηˆ(β) ∈ (0, 1)
such that group inequality can persist only if segregation lies above this threshold. If segregation
drops below the threshold, the result is a sharp adjustment in human capital and convergence to
equality. This convergence can result from a decline in the human capital of the initially advantaged
group if the initially disadvantaged group is large enough. Alternatively, it can result from a rise
in the human capital of the disadvantaged group if it’s population share is sufficiently small. The
threshold segregation level itself varies with β non-monotonically. When β is small, ηˆ(β) is the
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locus of pairs of η and β such that c(σb) = 0 at the state (sb, sw) = (0, 1) . Increasing β lowers
σb and hence raises c(σb), which implies that c(σb) = 0 holds at a lower level of η. Hence ηˆ(β) is
decreasing in this range, implying that higher values β require higher levels of integration before
the transition to equality is triggered. When β is larger than β˜, however, ηˆ(β) is the locus of pairs
of η and β such that c(σw) = 0 at the state (sb, sw) = (0, 1) . Increasing β lowers σw and hence
raises c(σw), which implies that c(σw) = 0 holds at a higher level of η. Hence ηˆ(β) is increasing in
this range, and higher values of β require lower levels of integration in order to induce the shift to
equality.
Greater integration within the regime of persistent inequality raises the costs to the advantaged
group and lowers costs to the disadvantaged group. In this case one might expect integration to be
resisted by the former and supported by the latter. Note, however, that this is no longer the case
if a transition to a different regime occurs. When β is small, both groups end up better off as a
consequence of integration, and hence support for integration may be expected to transcend group
boundaries in this case. Similarly, when β is large, both groups might be united in opposition to
integration policies that would reduce η below ηˆ (β), since both would end up with higher steady
state costs of human capital accumulation. (This feature of the model echoes findings in Chaudhuri
and Sethi (2003), which deals with the consequences of integration in the presence of statistical
discrimination.)
The simple model with homogeneous ability delivers a number of insights, but also has several
shortcomings. There is no behavioral heterogeneity within groups, and all steady states are at the
boundaries of the state space. Changes in segregation only affect human capital decisions if they
result in a transition from one regime to another; within a given regime changes in social network
quality affect costs but do not induce any behavioral response. Furthermore, even when transitions
to another regime occur, human capital decisions are affected in only one of the two groups. Finally,
convergence to a steady state occurs in a single period. These shortcomings do not arise when the
model is generalized to allow for heterogeneous ability within groups, which we consider next.
4 Heterogeneous Ability
When ability is heterogenous within groups (though distributed identically across groups), steady
states will typically involve heterogeneous choices within each of the groups. Given the state (sb, sw)
in period t, there will be a mean level of human capital s¯ in the population, and hence particular
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levels of mean human capital (σb,σw) in black and white social networks. These values determine
the ability thresholds a˜ (σb) and a˜ (σw) for blacks and whites respectively, such that all those with
abilities above the threshold for the group to which they belong will find it optimal to accumulate
human capital. For a given distribution of ability in both groups, these ability thresholds then
determine the state (sb, sw) for the subsequent period. A steady state is one which results in the
same human capital decisions from one period to the next.
As noted above, multiple steady states will exist under complete segregation if and only if there
are multiple solutions to equation (5). This in turn depends on details of the ability distribution and
cost function. If there exist multiple steady states under complete segregation, then there must also
exist an asymmetric steady state under complete segregation, in which the level of human capital
is lower among blacks than among whites. As in the homogeneous ability case, asymmetric steady
states cannot exist under complete integration. Hence there must be some level of integration above
which persistent inequality cannot be sustained.
To see the conditions under which multiple steady states arise under complete segregation,
consider the simple case of an ability distribution with density g(a), having mean 0 and support
(−∞,∞). Additionally, suppose that the costs of human capital accumulation are linear and sep-
arable in both ability and the mean human capital in one’s social network as follows:
c(a,σ) = (α− a)− 2ασ.
Setting c(a,σ) = 0, this specification implies threshold ability levels a˜ (σ) = α (1− 2σ) , with
thresholds ranging from α (when σ = 0) to −α (when σ = 1). Hence individuals with sufficiently
high ability (greater than α) will find it worthwhile to acquire human capital even if none of
their social affiliates have done so, and individuals with sufficiently low ability (less than −α) will
not acquire human capital even if all of their affiliates have done so. The parameter α may be
interpreted as the strength of social network effects.
When groups are completely segregated, σj = sj for each group j in all periods t, and hence
sj(t+ 1) = 1−G(a˜(sj(t))) = 1−G(α(1− 2sj(t))). (7)
Any pair (s∗b , s
∗
w) is a steady state if and only if, for each j,
s∗j = 1−G(α(1− 2s∗j )).
Since G(α) < 1 and G(−α) > 0, continuity of G (·) implies that there must exist at least one
symmetric steady state (s∗b = s
∗
w). Any symmetric steady state will be stable under the dynamics
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(4) if the slope of the function 1 − G(α(1 − 2sj)), evaluated at sj = s∗b = s∗w has absolute value
strictly below 1. Since this slope is positive, the condition for stability of a symmetric steady state







Figure 2. Stability and Multiplicity of Symmetric Steady States.
Clearly (s∗b , s
∗
w) = (0.5, 0.5) is a steady state since the distribution of ability is symmetric with
mean 0. This will be stable if 2αg(0) < 1 and unstable if 2αg(0) > 1. Since g(0) is independent
of α, this steady state will be unstable if α is sufficiently high, that is, if social network effects are
sufficiently strong. In this case there must exist at least two stable steady states under complete
segregation, one on either side of (s∗b , s
∗
w) = (0.5, 0.5). For example, when ability is distributed
according to the standard normal, there is a unique stable steady state at (s∗b , s
∗
w) = (0.5, 0.5) when
α = 1, but two symmetric stable steady states at (s∗b , s∗w) = (0.86, 0.86) and (s∗b , s∗w) = (0.14, 0.14)
when α = 2. These two cases are depicted in Figure 2. In the latter case, the asymmetric state
(s∗b , s
∗
w) = (0.14, 0.86) must be a stable steady state of the dynamics (4) under complete segregation.
When multiple equilibria arise under complete segregation, racial inequality can persist indef-
initely, with each of the two groups having converged to a different stable steady state. Since
perfect integration is inconsistent with persistent racial inequality, one might conjecture that there
is a threshold level of segregation such that racial inequality can persist indefinitely if and only of
segregation exceeds this threshold. Figure 3 illustrates this for the special case of a standard normal
ability distribution, with α = 1.75 and β = 0.4. Under complete segregation there is a stable steady
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state at (s∗b , s
∗
w) = (0.06, 0.94), and this is used as the initial state in each of the four simulations.
The panels in the top row reveal the persistence of racial inequality, although the extent of such
inequality is less when integration is greater. When η = 1, the population remains at the initial
stable steady state (by construction). When η = 0.9, convergence occurs to a nearby asymmetric
steady state at (s∗b , s
∗
w) = (0.13, 0.90). A further decline in segregation to η = 0.8 causes persis-
tent inequality to be unsustainable, an convergence occurs to a symmetric stable steady state at
(s∗b , s
∗
w) = (0.94, 0.94). The same happens when η = 0.7, although convergence is more rapid. Note
that integration can cause a temporary decline in the human capital of whites, through increasing










Figure 3. Effects of greater integration when β = 0.4.
Figure 4 reveals a strikingly different possibility. This time the black share of the population
is set at β = 0.6, while all other parameters and initial conditions are left unchanged. Again,
persistent inequality is unsustainable once integration proceeds beyond some threshold, but con-
vergence occurs to a steady state with very low levels of human capital. There is a temporary rise
in human capital of blacks (through greater contact with whites) but this is reversed as levels of
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Figure 4. Effects of greater integration when β = 0.6.
Figures 3—4 confirm that our findings in the homogeneous ability case extend to the case of
heterogeneous ability for the particular numerical specifications. To what extent do these results
apply more generally, for arbitrary cost and distribution functions? To explore this, recall that
group inequality can persist under complete segregation (η = 1) if and only if there are multiple
solutions to the equation
s = 1−G(a˜(s)).
Suppose that this is indeed the case, and that we have precisely three solutions (as in the right
panel of Figure 2). The two extreme solutions, which we now denote sl and sh, correspond to stable
symmetric steady states at all levels of segregation η. Furthermore, the (sl, sh) is an asymmetric
stable steady state when η = 1. Now consider the effects of increasing integration, starting from
this state. For any given population composition β, we shall say that integration is equalizing and
welfare-improving if there exists some segregation level ηˆ(β) such that for all η < ηˆ(β) there is no
stable asymmetric steady state, and the initial state (sl, sh) is in the basin of attraction of the high-
investment symmetric steady state (sh, sh). Similarly, we shall say that integration is equalizing
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and welfare-reducing if there exists some segregation level ηˆ(β) such that for all η < ηˆ(β) there is
no stable asymmetric steady state, and (sl, sh) is in the basin of attraction of the low-investment
symmetric steady state (sl, sl). We then have the following result.
Proposition 3. There exist βl > 0 and βh < 1 such that (i) integration is equalizing and welfare-
improving if β < βl and (ii) integration is equalizing and welfare-reducing if β > βh.
This result provides a partial generalization of our findings in the homogenous ability case.
When local complementarities in the accumulation of human capital are strong enough to allow for
multiple stable steady states under complete segregation, integration can have dramatic effects on
steady state levels of human capital. Once a threshold level of human capital is crossed, asymmetric
steady states may fail to exist resulting in a transition to equality. As in the case of homogeneous
ability, this can happen in one of two ways: through a sharp decline in the human capital of the
previously advantaged group, or through a sharp increase in the human capital of the previously
disadvantaged group. If the population share of the initially less affluent group is small enough,
integration can result in group equity (meaning that equally able individuals acquire similar levels
of human capital) and higher average incomes for both groups. Under these conditions, one should
expect broad popular support for integrationist policies. On the other hand, if the initially disad-
vantaged group constitutes a large proportion of the total population, equity may be still attained
through integration but at the cost of income, as costs are higher and human capital levels in both
groups decline.
5 Policy Implications
Thus integration may benefit the disadvantaged group without harming the advantaged group, as
is suggested by the empirical analysis by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) of the relationship between
segregation and high school graduation rates. But integration may also harm both groups. As a
result the the policy maker and the public are faced with a difficult challenge.
Since the heterogeneous ability case reproduces the logic of the simpler homogeneous ability
case, we will illustrate the policy implications of the model with the latter. Suppose that the
reduction in both segregation and between-group inequality are objectives, but the disadvantaged
population share is sufficiently great that the outcome of reduced segregation is likely to be a welfare
loss by both groups occasioned by a transition to low equilibrium levels of human capital acquisition
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by both groups. Does there exist a policy that will raise the value of β for which c(1 − β) = 0,
increasing the range of population shares for which the Pareto-improving transition to equal and
high levels of human capital acquisition can result from greater integration? Educational or other
policies resulting in a reduction in the cost function of human capital acquisition will accomplish
this, shifting ηˆ (β) upwards to the left of β˜ (because c (σb) = 0 at higher levels of segregation
following the educational improvement). To the right of β˜ the ηˆ (β) function shifts downward for
analogous reasons. Hence a race-neutral policy which successfully lowers the costs of human capital
accumulation for each individual in the population can make a Pareto-improving transition possible
for a broader range of population shares and segregation levels. This effect is illustrated in Figure
5.
Figure 5. Effects of a race-neutral policy lowering costs of human capital accumulation.
Contrary to what we have assumed, costs may differ between groups, the disadvantaged group
facing higher costs of acquiring human capital due, for example to less adequate schools or a less
supportive in-school environment. Policies to rectify this discrepancy will (as in the race neutral
case) shift upwards the left hand segment of the ηˆ (β) function; but will leave the right segment
unaffected. As a result such policies would be effective in promoting Pareto improving transitions
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to equality for sufficiently low β. Where the population share of the disadvantaged group is large
however, policies to reduce the costs of the advantaged group could be advocated as a means of
allowing substantial levels of integration without inducing a mutually disadvantageous transition
to equality. (Highly resourced magnet schools combined with bussing to promote integration may
provide an example of such policies.) Thus while race-neutral interventions to lower costs of human
capital investment can support Pareto-improving outcomes following desegregation, race-based in-
terventions may accomplishing the same ends at lower cost as long as the disadvantaged population
share is sufficiently high or low.
How might desegregation be accomplished? Recall that η does not reflect the imposition of
discriminatory practices by the advantaged on the disadvantaged group, as we have assumed these to
be absent. Rather the degree of segregation is the result of equilibrium sorting choices in residence,
friendships, couples and the like, arising in the absence of overt discrimination. Are there non-
paternalistic ways that a policy maker could legitimately alter these patterns? We think that there
are. First, under quite general conditions equilibrium sorting produces levels of segregation that
are Pareto-inefficient in the sense that an arbitrary reduction in segregation could enhance the well
being of members of both groups (Schelling, 1978). In this case policies to reduce, say, neighborhood
segregation do not override individual preferences over aggregate outcomes, but rather allow for
their greater satisfaction. Second, segregated networks may be the unintended result of current
policies whose reversal would lower η. For example the degree of racial segregation of friendship
networks in schools appears to be affected by the extent of tracking, the degree of cross grade
mixing, and the extent of racial mixing in extracurricular activities, all of which are subject to
alteration by school policies. (Moody, 2001). However, because the most important social affiliates
for the formation of human capital are parents and siblings and these kin networks are highly
racially segregated, there may be quite stringent limits to the degree to which segregation of the
relevant networks can be reduced in the absence of a reduction in racial assortment in childbearing.
6 Conclusions
In response to a lower court judge’s question about the effects of school segregation on African
American children a year prior to the Brown v. Board of Education decision by the Supreme
Court, Kenneth Clark had concluded “I think it is the kind of injury which would be as enduring
or lasting as the situation endured..” (Beggs, 1995, p. 11). Extending earlier work by Loury,
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Durlauf, Lundberg and Startz and others we have identified the conditions under which, in a
plausible dynamic model, the economic injury of segregation does indeed endure.
We have shown that group differences in economic success can persist across generations in the
absence of either discrimination or group ability differences provided that the social segregation of
networks is sufficiently great, and that there is a threshold level of segregation below which group
inequality cannot be sustained. A challenge to policy makers arises because crossing this threshold
may induce a transition to an equilibrium with either equally high or low levels of human capital
in both groups. Which of these will occur depends on the population share of the disadvantaged
group.
Thus the challenges facing policy makers in an urban area such as Baltimore are quite different
from those in Bangor or Burlington. Similarly the challenges of assuring group-equal opportunity in
other countries are quite different in New Zealand, where 15 percent of the population are Maori and
South Africa where the disadvantaged African population constitutes 78 percent of the total. We
have shown that race-neutral educational policies that reduce the costs of acquiring human capital
unambiguously increase the range of population shares over which, starting from a segregated and
unequal initial state, the process of integration will induce a transition to an equilibrium without
group inequality and with high levels of human capital.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. At the state (sb, sw) = (0, 1) , the mean skill share s¯ = 1− β from (1).
Hence, using (2), we get
σb = (1− η) (1− β) ,
σw = η + (1− η) (1− β) .
Since c (·) is a decreasing function, c(σb) is increasing in η and c(σw) is decreasing in η. Under
perfect integration (η = 0) we have σb = σw = 1− β, and the costs of human capital accumulation
are therefore c (1− β) for both groups. Under complete segregation, η = 1 and hence σb = 0 and
σw = 1. Hence under complete segregation, the costs of human capital accumulation are c(0) and
c(1) for blacks and whites respectively, where c(1) < 0 < c(0) from (6).
First consider the case β < β˜, which implies c (1− β) < 0. Since c(σw) is decreasing in η and
is negative at η = 0, it is negative for all η. Since c(σb) is increasing in η and is negative at η = 0
and positive at η = 1, there exists a unique ηˆ(β) such that c(σb) = 0. For all η > ηˆ(β), we have
c(σw) < 0 < c(σb), which implies that (sb, sw) = (0, 1) is a stable steady state. For all η < ηˆ(β), we
have c(σw) < c(σb) < 0, which implies that (sb, sw) = (0, 1) cannot be a steady state. Note that
any increase in β within the range β < β˜ raises c(σb). Since c(σb) is increasing in η, this lowers the
value of ηˆ(β), defined as the segregation level at which c(σb) = 0.
Next consider the case β > β˜, which implies c (1− β) > 0. Since c(σb) is increasing in η and
is positive at η = 0, it is positive for all η. Since c(σw) is decreasing in η and is positive at η = 0
and negative at η = 1, there exists a unique ηˆ(β) such that c(σw) = 0. For all η > ηˆ(β), we have
c(σw) < 0 < c(σb), which implies that (sb, sw) = (0, 1) is a stable steady state. For all η < ηˆ(β), we
have 0 < c(σw) < c(σb), which implies that (sb, sw) = (0, 1) cannot be a steady state. Note that
any increase in β within the range β > β˜ raises c(σw). Since c(σw) is decreasing in η, this raises
the value of ηˆ(β), defined as the segregation level at which c(σb) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. First consider the case β < β˜. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1
that if the economy is initially at (sb, sw) = (0, 1) , then for all η < ηˆ(β), we have c(σw) < c(σb) < 0.
Hence all individuals in each of the two groups will find it optimal to become skilled, resulting in a
transition to (sb, sw) = (1, 1) . This lowers both c(σw) and c(σb), and hence maintains the condition




= (1, 1) thereafter.
Next consider the case β > β˜. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that if the economy is
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initially at (sb, sw) = (0, 1) , then for all η < ηˆ(β), we have 0 < c(σw) < c(σb). Hence all individuals
in each of the two groups will find it optimal to remain unskilled, resulting in a transition to
(sb, sw) = (0, 0) . This raises both c(σw) and c(σb), and hence maintains the condition 0 < c(σw) <
c(σb). Hence the economy remains at (sb, sw) = (0, 0) thereafter.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using (1—3), we may write the dynamics of investment levels sb and sw
as follows
sb(t+ 1) = 1−G(a˜(ηsb(t) + (1− η) (βsb(t) + (1− β) sw(t)))
sw(t+ 1) = 1−G(a˜(ηsw(t) + (1− η) (βsb(t) + (1− β) sw(t)))
For each sw, define hb(sw) as the set of all sb satisfying
sb = 1−G(a˜(ηsb + (1− η) (βsb + (1− β) sw)).
This corresponds to the set of isoclines for the black population, namely the set of points at which
∆sb ≡ sb(t + 1) − sb(t) = 0 for any given sw. Similarly, for each sb, define hw(sb) as the set of all
sw satisfying
sw = 1−G(a˜(ηsw + (1− η) (βsb + (1− β) sw)).
This is the set of points at which ∆sw = 0 for any given sb.Any state (sb, sw) at which sb ∈ hb(sw)
and sw ∈ hw(sb) is a steady state. Now consider the extreme case η = 0, and examine the limiting
isoclines as β → 0. In this case hb(sw) is the set of all sb satisfying
sb = 1−G(a˜(sw))
and hw(sb) is the set of all sw satisfying
sw = 1−G(a˜(sw)).
There are exactly three solutions, sl, sm, and sh to the latter equation. Hence there are three
horizontal isoclines at which ∆sw = 0, as shown in the left panel of Figure 6. The former equation
generates a sincle isocline sb = hb(sw) which is strictly increasing, and satisfies hb(0) ∈ (0, sl),
hb(1) ∈ (sh, 1), and hb(s) = s for each s ∈ {sl, sm, sh}, also depiced in the left panel of Figure 6.
As is clear from the figure, only three steady states exist, all of which are symmetric. Only two of
these, (sl, sl) and (sh, sh) are stable. The initial state (sl, sh) is in the basin of attraction of of the
high investment steady state (sh, sh). Since the isoclines are all continuous in η and β at η = β = 0,
it follows that for β sufficiently small, integration is equalizing and welfare-improving.
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Next consider the limiting isoclines as β → 1 (maintining the assumption that η = 0). In this
case hb(sw) is the set of all sb satisfying
sb = 1−G(a˜(sb))
and hw(sb) is the set of all sw satisfying
sw = 1−G(a˜(sb)).
There are exactly three solutions, sl, sm, and sh to the former equation. Hence there are three
vertical isoclines at which ∆sb = 0, as shown in the right panel of Figure 6. The latter equation
generates a sincle isocline sw = hw(sb) which is strictly increasing, and satisfies hw(0) ∈ (0, sl),
hw(1) ∈ (sh, 1), and hw(s) = s for each s ∈ {sl, sm, sh}, also depiced in the right panel of Figure 6.
As in the case of β = 0, only three steady states exist, all of which are symmetric and two of which,
(sl, sl) and (sh, sh), are stable. The initial state (sl, sh) is in the basin of attraction of of the low
investment steady state (sl, sl). Since the isoclines are all continuous in η and β at η = 1− β = 0,





Figure 6. Limiting Isoclines for η = 0, with β → 0 (left) and β → 1 (right).
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